

Lawrence Hirschfield (with Scott Atran)	Dynamics of Sacred Values and Social Responsibilities in Governance and Conflict Management: The Interplay between Leaders, Devoted Actor Networks, General Populations, and Time
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2013 Minerva Awardee Blitz – Part I

Dynamics of Sacred Values and Social Responsibilities in Governance and Conflict Management:

The Interplay between Leaders, Devoted Actor Networks, General Populations, and Time

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Who Does Not Become a Terrorist, and Why?

Towards an Empirically Grounded
Understanding of Individual Motivation
in Terrorism

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Natural Resources and Armed Conflict

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The Resource Curse

- High-value natural resources (oil, minerals, drugs) associated with onset and longer duration of civil wars.
- Important explanations for this link rely on assumption that armed groups exercise control over these resources
- Controlling resources leads armed groups to:
 1. Finance start of rebellions
 2. Target civilians and engage in terrorism
 3. Recruit members with financial incentives rather than appeals to shared grievances
 4. Resist peaceful settlements of disputes

Controlling Resources

- But little systematic data exists documenting if or how groups control or benefit from natural resources
- Our project directly measures control for armed groups world-wide from 1990 to 2012
- Triangulate data collection with three efforts:
 1. Human coding of evidence of control in primary and secondary literature
 2. Machine coding of media reports linking rebel groups to resources
 3. Development of fine-grained data in GIS format on location and value of natural resources

Research Questions

- Does control of resources increase the likelihood, severity, and duration of ethnic rebellion?
- Do groups that control resources engage in more violence against civilians?
- How important are natural resources for financing rebellion compared to other sources, such as state support, diasporas, etc.?
- How do the different ways that rebels can exploit resources (protection rackets, theft, booty futures) influence their duration, use of violence, and cohesion?

Implications

Better understanding how groups control and benefit from natural resources is valuable because:

- Allows assessment of hypotheses that link control to behavior of rebel groups
- Permits better risk assessments of how the presence of natural resources in a country influences the likelihood, nature, and duration of conflict
- Allows assessment of policy tools such as attempts to restrict export of “conflict minerals” and steps to counter financing of rebel groups

Homeownership & Societal Stability: Testing Causal Effects in Central Eurasia


{ Theodore P. Gerber, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Jane Zavisca, University of Arizona



Why housing? Why instability?

- Housing: an understudied aspect of inequality, well-being, and potential political significance
 - Use value + exchange value
 - Bundled property rights
 - Core part of daily experience
- Housing usually studied in terms of social stratification, wealth formation, demography
 - Potential political relevance has been unappreciated

Theoretical model of how housing might affect societal stability



Hypotheses: Effects of housing status on factors that promote societal (in)stability

- H1: Housing effects on political grievances.** Disadvantage with respect to housing status is an independent source of political grievances at local, regional, and national levels of govt.
- H2: Housing effects on social grievances.** Adverse housing drives animosities toward others via housing envy or housing nativism. These processes can operate sociotropically.
- H3: Effects of housing status inconsistency.** Housing status inconsistency exacerbates political and social grievances. Disadvantage on one dimension of status fosters especially severe discontent among those with advantages in other respects.
- H4A: Effects of homeownership on civic outcomes.** a) *subjective efficacy*: housing autonomy fosters agency; b) *social capital*: usage rights lengthen time horizon of residence; c) *civic engagement*: usage and exchange rights encourage civic behaviors; d) *generalized trust*: homeownership effects combine to enhance trust in others.
- H4B. Effects of homeownership on civic withdrawal.** Private property may promote private lives. Exchange interests may lead to distrust of unwelcome newcomers.
- H5A: Homeownership effects on support for markets and democracy.** Investment interests in exchange value of property and the experience of autonomy and personal responsibility homeownership provides shape ideological orientations.
- H5B: Homeownership effects on opposition to markets and democracy.** Homeownership engenders opposition to markets and/or democracy when a) property rights are insecure, and b) institutions supporting homeownership conflict with local norms/customs.

Hypotheses: Macro-micro linkages

- H6. Regime type.** When homeownership increases ideological support for democracy, this enhances legitimacy of democratic regimes but engender dissent against undemocratic regimes; an analogous hypothesis holds true for support for markets
- H7. Culture.** Variable effects depending on, e.g., urban vs. rural, Islamic religion, gender traditionalism
- H8. Social structure.** Adverse housing conditions lead to stronger grievances when population pressures aggravate the issues (youth bulges, migrant/refugee populations, economic inequality and relative deprivation)
- H9. Social climate and conflict.** Social grievance effects of housing strongest in settings that have recently experienced inter-group violence
- H10. Individual vs. household-level effects.** Within household variations in housing status mean different effects operate
- H11. Temporal variation.** Changes drive grievance effects; continuity encourages civic norms and ideology effects

Post-Soviet countries: test case

- Study countries:
 - Azerbaijan
 - Kyrgyzstan
 - Russia
 - Ukraine
- Exogenous distribution of housing
- Variation across countries in macro conditions
 - Regime type, culture, demography, economic performance, social climate, etc.
- Real possibilities of instability in the coming years

Table 1: Characteristics of the Study Countries in 2011

	Azerbaijan	Kyrgyzstan	Russia	Ukraine
Degree of authoritarianism	Mostly authoritarian	Partially democratic	Mostly authoritarian	Partially democratic
Predominant Religion	Shia Islam	Sunni Islam	Orthodox	Orthodox
Largest ethnic group	Azeris (91%)	Kyrgyz (65%)	Russian (80%)	Ukrainian (78%)
Population	8.2 million	5.5 million	142.5 million	44.8 million
Percent Urban	52%	35%	73%	69%
Population under 15	23%	30%	16%	14%
GDP Per Capita, PPP-adjusted	\$10,200	\$2,400	\$16,700	\$7,200
Poverty Rate	11%	34%	13%	35%
Gini Index	.337	.334	.420	.275
Internally Displaced Persons	593,000	?	10,000	negligible
Mortgage to GDP ratio	0.4	?	2.7	8.5

Sources: CIA World Factbook; Freedom House 2012; European Mortgage Foundation 2011.

Research Design

- Two waves of focus groups and surveys in each country
 - Common questions and country-specific
- Statistical analyses testing hypotheses at individual and macro levels
 - Attempts to identify causal effects

Samples

- We will survey nationally-representative samples of 1600 adults ages 18-49
- Also oversamples in each country:
 - Azerbaijan: 800 IDPs, half who live in government refugee camps and half in unofficial (squatter) housing.
 - Kyrgyzstan: 800 residents in regions with recent histories of political violence.
 - Russia: 800 residents in four Muslim-majority provinces.
 - Ukraine: 800 respondents who have borrowed money from banks or developers to purchase their dwellings.

Planned Analyses

- Tests for exogenous distribution of each theoretically important component of housing status.
- Structural equation modeling to develop precise measures of theoretical constructs and distinguish direct from indirect effects of different components of housing status.
- To deal with potential endogeneity: instrumental variable estimation, propensity score estimation with sensitivity analysis, and difference-in-differences.
- Multilevel models (at region level) to test hypotheses regarding macro-micro linkages.

METANORM:

A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Analysis and Evaluation of Norms and Models of Governance for Cyberspace

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Detering Complex Threats: The Effects of Asymmetry, Interdependence, and Multi- polarity on International Strategy

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Public Service Provision as Peace-building: How do Autonomous Efforts Compare to Internationally Aided Interventions?

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